

# CAN SHALE GAS KILL GAZPROM?

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**Unconventional Gas Market Scenarios**  
**21-22 May 2012, Berlin**




# Gazprom: Anticipations of 2010




- This is a part of Slide 24 of Gazprom Investor Day presentation of 2010.
  - At that time Gazprom was aiming to take 10% of the US gas market by 2015.
  - Gazprom planned to export LNG from Sakhalin and Shtokman to North America.
  - In April 2010, Gazprom signed an agreement to supply LNG to Lake Charles, La.
  - “The so called shale gas revolution is one and the same thing as American Hollywood”, - Alexey Miller’s interview with Süddeutsche Zeitung, **Jan-26, 2012**.
- “Shale gas <..> can dramatically restructure the hydrocarbons market”, - Vladimir Putin, April 11, 2012.

# European Exports of Gazprom



- **Gazprom still foresees its 2020 exports to Europe at about 225 bcm.**
- **Gazprom reports the minimum guaranteed contracted volume for the period from 2020 to 2025 at 158 bcma (it could be too optimistic).**
- **After the crisis of 2008, the target for 2015 was lowered by 13 bcm, while the one for 2020 remained intact.**
- **Gazprom anticipates faster growth of exports than in 2002-2006.**
  - **Gazprom may need high plans to justify its pipeline construction program.**


# European Exports Breakdown




- By about 2022, the combined European export capacity is to reach **318 bcma** or twice the guaranteed contracted volume.
- Gazprom needs to fill up North Stream and South Stream pipelines.
- Ukrainian transit is to disappear in 2019.
- From about 2020, transit of Russian gas through Belarus and Poland is likely to decline steadily.
  - The Yamal-Europe pipeline flow is already lower than in Q1-2011.

# Gas Sales Revenue of Gazprom

- **European sales are likely to go down.**
  - Gazprom gave price discount to several European clients.
  - Low or no growth of sales volumes.
- **FSU price (net of customs duties) is 15% below the European price.**
  - No cost of international transit.
- **Russian sales revenue growth is limited.**
  - Wholesale price of gas for industrial consumers in Russia is to achieve netback parity with European export sales by 2015 (according to the law).
  - This is unrealistic.



# End-Use Price of Gas for Power Generation



# The Pincer Movement (Investment Maximization Plan)


**Does Gazprom need conflicts to justify its pipeline construction plans?**

**For investment maximization, Ukraine suits better than Poland**

**>150 bcma of spare capacity by 2020**


**The existing pipelines can evacuate all gas produced in W-Siberia, incl. Yamal**

**Bovanenkovo – Russkaya link costs about € 30 billion (excluding South Stream)**



# Russia-Ukraine “2d Gas War” – 2009

- Without a signed contract, Gazprom and Naftogaz disagreed about the origin of the fuel gas for compressor stations.
- Vladimir Putin ordered to turn off the tap after Gazprom’s alleged loss of 65.3 mmcm of fuel gas valued at €20 Million.
- This action has caused Gazprom a direct loss of €1.5 Bn.
- Cost of new pipelines (**inside Russia only**) to feed South Stream exceeds €30 Bn.
- **Contractors and intermediaries needed this conflict.**




# Pipeline Cost Comparison

The Alaska Pipeline Project - € 7.7 M/km

1400 mm, 58 bcm/yr, € 12.4 M/km

Name	L, km	D, mm	C, bcm/yr	Cost, € M/km
Gryazovets-Vyborg-1 (Nord Stream Russia)	917	1400	~34.0	4.9
Gryazovets-Vyborg-2 (Nord Stream Russia)	703	1400	~21.0	3.5
OPAL (Nord Stream Germany)	470	1400	35.0	2.1
Nord Stream (Baltic Sea)	1224	1153	27.5	3.4
Dzhubga-Sochi (Black Sea)	177	530	3.8	>5.0



# Sales Down? – Let’s Build Another Pipeline!


(before we run out of money)

- **Gazprom announces a new pipeline expansion project after nearly every drop of export sales.**
  - Responding to the crisis of 2008, Gazprom has increased the design capacity of the South Stream pipeline.
  - The decline of European sales in Q1-2012 was followed by the announcement of possible increase of the Nord Stream capacity.
- **To fill up additional export capacity, Gazprom would need to build new feeding pipelines inside Russia.**
  - Apparently, Gazprom executives are concerned about the future profits of contractors.



# Pipeline Construction Has Just Started

## Gazprom Investment Plan, € Bn




- The real full-scale pipeline construction starts in 2013.
  - In 2013, the investment is to reach about 50% of the annual revenue.
- Most of the investment will go to the construction of new pipelines delivering gas from the Yamal Peninsula to the Black Sea.
- Gazprom evaluates the chances for high gas demand in Russia at 2% and in Europe at 19%.
  - It would be difficult to prolong the expiring European contracts on the old terms (oil indexation, high take-or-pay share).
- Gazprom always chooses the most expensive option.
  - New pipelines instead of storage facilities.
  - Maximization of profits of contractors and intermediaries instead of shareholders' profits.


# Investment Program Can Kill Gazprom

- Export of gas produced in Russia is the most profitable operation of Gazprom.
  - Gazprom reduces shareholders' profits by adding foreign gas to its export portfolio.
- Current profit margin allows a substantial price reduction.
- A sharp growth of transportation costs is expected.
  - Gazprom builds an extremely expensive new pipeline system to evacuate the Yamal gas.
  - The new expensive lines will be fully loaded while the existing ones will have a lot of spare capacity.
- Gazprom needs a high price in 2020.
- **At \$13-14/MMBtu, shale gas can beat Russian gas in Europe.**

Production cost, \$/mcm



Cost of Exports, \$/mcm



# Other Factors – Caspian Gas



- Gas reserves of the Caspian region are of the same size as the Yamal reserves.
- Gas production cost in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan is much lower than in Yamal.
- Gas fields of Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are closer to Europe than Yamal.
  - Pipeline construction cost in Russia is much higher than in the Caucasus and Turkey.
- Caspian gas will inevitably come to Europe by the shortest route.
- An agreement between Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and the EU would be a major breakthrough.

**Yamal - South Stream - Europe**


- Proven reserves – 16 tcm
- High production cost
- Extremely high pipeline construction cost in Russia
- Cost of South Stream - € 15.5 bn

**Turkmenistan gas field can get a higher netback and a better return on investment**

- Assuming Southern Gas Corridor doesn't hire Gazprom's contractor

**Galkynys – Shah Deniz - Europe**

- Proven reserves – 17+ tcm
- Closer to Europe
- Production and transmission costs:
  - Much lower than in Russia



# Competitive Capacity of Gazprom



- **Gazprom is doing a great job supplying gas from West Siberia to consumers in Russia, FSU and Europe.**
  - **Gazprom is capable to supply over 2 bcm per day.**
- **In the past decade, Gazprom succeeded in reducing the number of pipeline failures by 50% (adequate rehabilitation).**
- **Gazprom has a huge cost reduction potential.**
- **Unfortunately, this potential is ignored by the current executive board of the company.**

# THANK YOU DANKE

