pipelines and export capacity
Газопроводы Газпрома и экспортные мощности
Gas pipelines of West Siberia
Газопроводы Западной Сибири
Export flows of Gazprom
Spot, Gazprom, Brent
Цены на нефть и
End-use price of gas
Russia and USA
Daily gas production
Improving the Image of Gazprom
Same as the Kremlin after the gas
conflict between Russia and Ukraine a year ago, Gazprom has hired a public
relations firm to improve its image abroad. Here is a short list of problems
complicating the PR campaign.
Gazprom blocks access to
Central Asian gas but expects Ukraine, Belarus and other states located
between Russia and major European markets to follow the principles of
freedom of transit. Central Asian gas can be bought only through designated
brokers whose service can be very expensive. For instance, Gazprom’s
ZMB (Schweiz) AG buys Turkmen gas
at $100 per 1000 cub m and resells it to Georgia at $235. If Georgia were
able to buy gas directly, then after paying transit fees the cost of gas
would have been about $130 per 1000 cub m.
According to numerous
statements of Gazprom, Swiss broker Rosukrenergo AG
was created as a financial tool for investment into expansion of pipeline
capacity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. So far, no money was invested, but
Messrs D.Firtash and D.Fursin, half-owners of the Swiss broker, received
$368 million in dividends for 2005 alone. The fact of dividends' payment of $735 million out
of the reported 2005 profit of $742 million indicates that Rosukrenergo is
far from being an investment tool. Financial reports of Gazprom show that
Rosukrenergo profit came from two sources: (1) the low fixed price of
Central Asian gas sold by Gazprom, and (2) re-exports of gas to Europe at
free market price.
Former Gazprom CEOs Rem Vyakhirev, Viktor Chernomyrdin and their
predecessors of the USSR Gas Ministry have never threatened neighbor
countries by cutting off gas supplies. Public threats broadcasted by TV and
other media have become a normal practice under CEO Aleksey Miller.
Gazprom's decision to
priority destination of Shtokman gas from the USA to Germany was not motivated
by profit. While LNG project and gas pipeline from the
Barents Sea to Germany require roughly equal investment costs, LNG exports
from Russia have huge tax advantage – they are
free of export
duty, which takes 30% of gross revenue of exports by pipeline. On top of
that, the price of imported LNG in the U.S. is higher than the price of
imported pipeline gas in the European Union. The choice of more risky and
less profitable pipeline option indicates that Gazprom is Russia’s ministry
for international energy affairs rather than a joint-stock company. It also
shows that the major shareholder of Gazprom - the Russian Federation -
considers tax collection a way more important than Gazprom's profit and
Gazprom has started the PR campaign by rewriting the recent history.
Interviewed by "Kommersant",
Konstantin Chuichenko, head of legal department of Gazprom and executive
director of Rosukrenergo, said that competition of Ukraine and Gazexport has
caused an increase of price of Turkmen gas from $44 to $65 per 1000 cub m.
This statement contradicts official reports of Gazprom.
for Q3-2005 says that the average price of Central Asian gas sold by
Gazprom to RUE was $43 per 1000 cub m (page 25). From January 2005,
Rosukrenergo was the sole exporter of Turkmen gas to Ukraine (page 4 of
Discussion"). According to
press-release of December 29, 2005, the price of Turkmen gas was raised
from January 2006. Ukraine was unable to compete with Gazprom at that time.
The increase of Turkmen price to $65 and then to $100 was an adequate
response to the change of Gazprom's pricing policy in the former Soviet
To improve its reputation, Gazprom
requires real actions. Camouflaging and playing with terminology would be a
waste of money.
January 24, 2007