Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict: Financial
Effects of the Russian Side (in
PDF format)
Gazprom agrees to accept financial loss
Media reports and
political statements misunderstand the economic part of Ukrainian gas
transit problem. Gazprom does not simply sell gas to Ukraine as Turkmenistan
does. Russian gas monopoly delivers gas as payment in kind for Ukrainian
transit services. For years, the Ukrainian transit tariff was set at the
rate, which allowed Ukraine to generate enough cash for an agreed volume of
gas. The transit tariff matched the price of gas delivered as payment for
transit services, which means that the value of payment gas was equal to the
transit revenue of Ukraine.
After 2000, payment gas
volume was agreed at 26 bcmy (billion cubic meters per year) and the price
at $50/mcm (thousand cubic meters). Transit tariff was set at $1.0937/mcm
per 100 km. At a briefing on June 7, 2005, Mr. A.Ryazanov, Deputy Chairman
of Executive Board of Gazprom, said that the price and the tariff rate were
very profitable for Gazprom and there was a good partnership and mutual
understanding with Ukraine (briefing
transcript in Russian).
By raising the price of
payment gas, Gazprom increases its own transit expense in Ukraine. Ukraine,
in turn, can raise its transit tariff to generate enough cash for buying the
same volume of gas it gets now. Then Gazprom would have higher expenses, no
profit and three times higher export duty.
On the positive side,
Ukrainian transit tariff is linked to the tariff Gazprom charges for the
transit of Turkmen gas. It means that a raise of Ukrainian tariff also increases the
transit revenue of Gazprom.
Table 1 shows our
estimations of effects of the raise of Ukrainian gas price on the financial
results of Gazprom. For the sake of comparison, we use the transportation
work and transit volumes of 2004.
Table 1:
Gazprom’s Financial Results of the Raise of Ukrainian Gas Price
|
Unit |
$50/mcm |
$120/mcm |
$160/mcm |
Gazprom sales revenue: |
|
|
|
|
Gas volume |
bcm |
26 |
26 |
26 |
Value of gas |
$ million |
1300 |
3120 |
4160 |
Cash payment for transit |
$ million |
250 |
3120 |
4160 |
Cost of transit service |
$ million |
1550 |
3120 |
4160 |
Transportation work |
thous. bcm * km |
142 |
142 |
142 |
Transit tariff |
$/mcm/100km |
1.09 |
2.20 |
2.94 |
Export duty of Gazprom |
$ million |
390 |
936 |
1248 |
Difference from 2005 |
$ million |
- |
-546 |
-858 |
Gazprom transit
revenue: |
|
|
|
|
Transit volume from Turkmenistan |
bcm |
34 |
34 |
34 |
Transit tariff |
$/mcm/100km |
1.09 |
2.20 |
2.94 |
Gross transit revenue |
$ million |
312 |
629 |
838 |
Difference from 2005 |
$ million |
- |
316 |
526 |
Combined result
of Gazprom: |
$ million |
- |
-230 |
-332 |
Compared with the current
rate of $50/mcm, a raise of price to $120/mcm adds $316 million in transit
revenues, but takes $546 million in additional exports duties. The combined
result of price increase from $50/mcm to $120/mcm is a loss of $230 million.
If the price is raised to $160/mcm, then the loss increases to $332 million.
Please note that the
current price of $50/mcm is below the estimated cost of Russian gas
delivered to the Ukrainian border, so Gazprom is breaking the Russian tax
code for over a year.
Russian side is likely to
have the following effects of the raise of gas price for Ukraine. The
government gains as tax collector, but loses as the main shareholder of
Gazprom. All minority shareholders of Gazprom just lose.
See on the same topic:
Clarifying the Math of Ukrainian Transit
Tariff
Brief History of Soviet and Russian Gas
Pipeline Policy