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Nord Stream and South Stream
pipelines would have been unable to help Eastern Europe
"If we'd had
Nord Stream and South Stream, the Russia-Ukraine dispute would not have been
a problem - as long as you take the view that this was Ukraine's fault,"
said Jonathan Stern, director of gas research at the Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies.
The Wall Street Journal,
January 10, 2009
I believe
numbers can explain this problem better than words. Table 1 shows the
daily export flows of Russian gas supplying the record low European demand
of early January 2009.
Table
1.
Daily export flows of Russian gas at the level of 01.01.2009,
mmcm
|
Gas export route or destination |
N0 |
N1 |
N2 |
N2+S |
Ukraine
|
299
|
211 |
123 |
18 |
Belarus (1)
|
117
|
117 |
117 |
117 |
|
Finland |
16 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
|
Blue Stream (1) |
48 |
48 |
48 |
48 |
|
Nord Stream |
- |
88 |
176 |
176 |
|
South Stream |
- |
- |
- |
105 |
|
TOTAL: |
480 |
480 |
480 |
480 |
(1) Daily flows
reported by
Kommersant.
N0 = current
situation; N1 = 1st line of Nord Stream commissioned;
N2 = 2d line of Nord
Stream completed;
N2+S = Nord Stream
and South Stream completed.
In case of all new export
projects of Gazprom completed, Ukraine would still had to ship 18 million
cubic meters (mmcm) of Russian gas to Europe daily. This is more that the
alleged Ukrainian siphoning of 14 mmcm/day
mentioned by Vladimir Putin. Countries like Slovakia (imports 12 mmcm/d), Czech
Republic (15 mmcm/d) and Romania (10 mmcm/d) would still be at risk.
Table 2 gives the daily export
flows of Russian gas at the level of January 2008 (570
mmcm/d) and January 2020 (780 mmcm/d).
Table
2.
Daily export flows of Russian gas at the level of January 2008 and
January 2020,
mmcm
|
Gas export route or destination |
N0 |
N1 |
N2 |
N2+S |
MAX |
Ukraine
|
388
|
300 |
212 |
107 |
300 |
Belarus
|
117
|
117 |
117 |
117 |
128 |
|
Finland |
17 |
17 |
17 |
17 |
18 |
|
Blue Stream |
48 |
48 |
48 |
48 |
53 |
|
Nord Stream |
- |
88 |
176 |
176 |
176 |
|
South Stream |
- |
- |
- |
105 |
105 |
|
TOTAL: |
570 |
570 |
570 |
570 |
780 |
N0 = current
situation; N1 = 1st line of Nord Stream commissioned;
N2 = 2d line of Nord
Stream completed;
N2+S = Nord Stream
and South Stream completed;
MAX = Gazprom
scenario for 2020 (see our comment
of Jan-5-2009).
If the
European demand is back at the level of January 2008 and all Gazprom's
projects are completed, then the countries of Eastern and Central Europe
would be still at risk. The Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines can
increase the security of supply of gas to Germany and Bulgaria only. If everything
goes in accordance with the plans of Gazprom, then in January 2020, Ukraine
would still be shipping to Europe exactly the same volume of Russian gas as
at the start of current crisis.
In my view, the Nord Stream
project represents a big risk to the energy security of Poland. If Polish
government takes a decision that Russia considers wrong, there is no doubt
that the gas flow to Poland would be stopped. Having the Nord Stream
pipeline, Gazprom would be able to do it without reducing exports to
Germany. The "safe" cutoff of Poland may be the main idea of the Nord Stream project
(see our comment of Jan-5-2009).
The strategy
of bypassing Ukraine is counterproductive and leads to enormous investment
costs. Please note that the South Stream project alone, without the feeding
lines running from the Yamal peninsula, is nearly twice more expensive than
the Nabucco pipeline. The transportation cost of gas via the South Stream
pipeline is much higher than the cost of transit via Ukraine. Every new
export pipeline means higher operating costs and lower profits of Gazprom.
Mikhail Korchemkin
January 12, 2009
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