Economics of Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict: 
	Who won the war?  - Updated
	RosUkrEnergo may be the 
	real winner. Free market in Russia is the loser. We 
	made these estimations before the the text of Gazprom-NAK Naftogaz agreement 
	was published.
	
	The "gas war" is over. Statements of Russian 
	and Ukrainian parties are not quite clear yet. The only clear numbers are 
	the export price of $230/mcm (mcm = 1000 m3) of Gazprom and the average 
	import price of $95/mcm of Ukraine. According to our calculations, this 
	combination works only if Gazprom exports to Ukraine a maximum of 6.5 bcm of 
	gas per year. Turkmenistan is to supply 40.0 bcm and 10.0 bcm is to be 
	delivered from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Table 1 below summarizes gains and 
	losses of involved parties, except for RosukrEnergo.
	
	Table 1. Gains and 
	Losses of the Gas Conflict: Preliminary Estimations
	
		
			|   |  Unit |  2005 |  2006 | 
		
			| 
			 NAK 
			Naftogaz of Ukraine: |  |  |  | 
		
			|  Average price of imported gas |  $/mcm  | 63.6 | 95.0 | 
		
			|  Volume of imported gas |  bcm  | 58.0 | 56.5 | 
		
			|  Cost of imported gas |  $ billion  | -3.7 | -5.4 | 
		
			|  Ukrainian transit tariff  |  $/mcm/100km  | 1.09 | 1.60 | 
		
			|  Transit revenue |  $ billion  | 1.6 | 2.3 | 
		
			|  Balance |  $ billion  | -2.1 | -3.1 | 
		
			|  |   $ billion  |  -    | -1.0 | 
		
			| 
			 Change after payment from RosUkrEnergo |   $ billion  |  -    |  ?    | 
		
			| 
			
			 Gazprom: | 
			  | 
			  | 
			  | 
		
			|  Price of exported gas |  $/mcm  | 50.0 |  230.0 | 
		
			|  Sales to Ukraine | bcm | 21.0 | 6.5 | 
		
			|  Sales revenue |  $ billion  | 1.1 | 1.5 | 
		
			|  Sales revenue net of export duties |  $ billion  | 0.7 | 1.0 | 
		
			|  Transit volume of gas from Central Asia | bcm | 37.0 | 50.0 | 
		
			|  Transit revenue:  | $ billion | 0.3 | 0.7 | 
		
			|  Ukrainian transit cost |  $ billion  | -1.6 | -2.3 | 
		
			|  Balance |  $ billion  | 0.2 | 0.3 | 
		
			|  |   $ billion  |  -    | 0.0 | 
		
			|  Gas available for additional sales | bcm |  -    | 14.5 | 
		
			|  Gazprom price of for RosUkrEnergo |  $/mcm  |  -    | 93.0 | 
		
			|  Sales revenue net of export duties |  $ billion  |  -    | 0.9 | 
		
			|  |  $ billion  |  -    | 0.9 | 
		
			| 
			 Russia: | 
			  | 
			  | 
			  | 
		
			|  Export duties | $ billion | 0.3 | 0.9 | 
		
			|  |   $ billion  |  -    | 0.5 | 
	
	
	NAK Nafotagaz of Ukraine loses about one 
	billion dollars a year before getting its share from RosUkrEnergo. The 
	Ukrainian firm decided not to introduce storage capacity reservation fee for 
	Gazprom.
	
	Gazprom breaks even in terms of transit 
	relations with Ukraine, but saves 14.5 bcm for additional exports. 
	Apparently, the additional exports go through RosUkrEnergo, though having a 
	broker for exports of Russian gas does not make sense. It does make a lot of 
	sense in case of Central Asian gas because transit sales of foreign broker 
	are exempt from export duties.
	
	Gas price at the European border has nothing 
	to do with the price of gas sold by Gazprom to RosUkrEnergo. According to
	
	Gazprom report for Q2-2005, in the first half of 2005, Gazprom was 
	selling gas to RosUkrEnergo in Ukraine at $93/mcm, while the average 
	European price was $174.4/mcm. The broker then exported gas to Europe. Half 
	of the profit of RosUkrEnergo is reported in the books of Gazprom and 
	another half elsewhere. We are unfamiliar with the operating expenses of 
	RosUkrEnergo. Apparently, the Swiss broker plans to increase re-exports to 
	Europe in 2006 while buying more gas from Gazprom at a discount.
	
	In our view, a 100% daughter company of 
	Gazprom, like Gazprom UK or ZMB GmbH, could be a better foreign 
	intermediary for Central Asian gas, especially if the transactions were set on non-profit basis and 
	all profits went to the shareholders of Gazprom. RosUkrEnergo makes profits 
	for other parties and transfers them to Switzerland.
	
	Russian state is a winner with an additional 
	tax collection of $0.5 billion a year.
	
	Final gains of Gazprom and RosUkrEnergo are unclear, though it looks like the Swiss broker gets a major 
	boost right before the announced IPO. This is a nice coincidence.
	
	The Russian free market is a clear loser. 
	Several independent gas producers in Russia can easily beat the $230 price 
	of Gazprom. However, nobody dares even to think of making an 
	offer to Ukraine. Selling gas to Russian consumers at state-regulated price 
	of $30-$45/mcm is more safe.
	
	
	Mikhail Korchemkin
	
	
	January 4, 2006
	
	 
	
	Previous publications on 
	Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute:
	
	Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict: Lack of Free Market in Russia
	
	Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict: Financial 
	Effects of the Russian Side 
	- 2
	
	Russian-Ukrainian Gas Conflict: Financial Effects of the 
					Russian Side 
	
	Brief 
					history of Soviet and Russian gas pipeline policy
	
	Clarifying 
					the math of Ukrainian transit tariff